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Severe Tests in Neuroimaging: What We Can Learn and How We Can Learn It 
1. Introduction 
Considerable methodological difficulties abound in neuroimaging; several philosophers of science, 
notably Klein (2010) and Roskies (2008, 2010), have called into question the potential of 
neuroimaging studies to contribute to our knowledge of human cognition. One general conclusion in 
these skeptical accounts is that functional hypotheses about cognitive processes are underdetermined 
by neuroimaging data. Yet, functional neuroimaging research continues to grow, so there is a need to 
address the question of what it is that we can learn from neuroimaging. After briefly discussing works 
by Klein and Roskies, I will apply to functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
1
 Mayo’s error-
statistical (ES) notions of severe tests, error probabilities, and a hierarchical framework of models of 
inquiry.  The ES account helps clarify the evidential import of neuroimaging data and formulate the 
conditions under which we can reliably infer we have evidence for or against functional hypotheses. 
Thus, we can answer the question ‘what can we reliably learn from neuroimaging?’ and make sense of 
how this knowledge can contribute to cognitive neuroscience and lead to novel construals of cognition.  
 
2. Skepticism About Functional Neuroimaging 
Klein (2010) and Roskies (2008, 2010) have different arguments based on various premises, but they 
both come to similar skeptical conclusions regarding the epistemic value of neuroimaging. Klein 
(2010) has raised criticisms directed at the use of statistical hypothesis testing in neuroimaging 
experiments. When researchers compare observed brain activation in a control condition against an 
experimental condition, where subjects perform the given cognitive task, they test the null hypothesis 
that there is no significant difference between the conditions against the alternative hypothesis that 
predicts a difference. The null hypothesis assigns probabilities to certain outcomes in the scenario 
where it is true and the probability of a certain outcome under the null hypothesis is its p-value. If the 
p-value of the observed outcome is smaller than a predetermined significance threshold, then we have 
a significant result; we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is a significant difference 
between the control and experimental conditions. The central premise in Klein’s argument is that in 
neuroimaging it is relatively easy to find significant results even when there is no real effect. For 
example, in order for a region of the brain to be identified as 'active' there has to be a statistically 
significant difference between degrees of observed activation in that brain region across control and 
experimental conditions, so choosing an overly liberal threshold for significance may yield spurious 
results. The charge is that when we observe significantly high activation in a given brain region, this 
may not be because there really is increased task-related activity in that region, but because we have 
chosen a significance threshold too liberal that it picks up background noise as if a real effect. Indeed, 
this is a real problem and is known in the error-statistical literature as the simple fallacy of rejection.  
Of course, there are factors other than the chosen threshold that may bias analyses and yield 
significant results in the absence of a real effect. Klein (2010) discusses how the signal-to-noise ratio 
in neuroimaging can be improved by increasing the number of subjects, which increases the sensitivity 
of the experiment. Consequently, significant results yielded by the experiment may have occurred only 
because the number of subjects was increased and not because there is a real effect. Klein claims that 
neuroimaging runs into problems not as a consequence of its inherent characteristics, but because it 
requires statistical hypothesis testing to draw inferences about functional hypotheses. Because of these 
and other similar problems, Klein concludes that the best use of neuroimaging experiments is to serve 
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as “first-pass sanity check[s] on experimental data” which can never “confirm functional hypotheses” 
(2010, 275). Klein is obviously right in criticizing flawed practices of hypothesis testing. However, it 
is crucial to note that these flawed practices occur not because of any inherent characteristics of 
statistical hypothesis testing but rather because of misunderstandings and misuses of these tests. The 
ES notions of severe tests and error probabilities help remedy these misunderstandings and misuses as 
will be described below.  
Roskies has also emphasized methodological issues in neuroimaging and suggested that the 
perceived epistemic status of neuroimages is higher than their real epistemic status (2008, 2010). In 
order to interpret neuroimaging results correctly, we need to have a way of knowing their actual 
epistemic status. According to Roskies, “determining actual epistemic status will involve a 
characterization of the inferential steps that mediate between observations and the phenomena they 
purport to provide information about” (2010, 197). She introduces the term inferential distance to refer 
to the totality of these inferential steps and argues that the problem in neuroimaging is the mismatch 
between the “actual inferential distance” and the “apparent inferential distance.” There are a great 
number of technical and inferential procedures in neuroimaging that have to be carried out between 
initial measurements of brain activation and final neuroimages. Because of the complexity of these 
procedures, Roskies concludes that the nature of the inferential steps in neuroimaging cannot be 
sufficiently characterized, which lowers the reliability of inferences drawn from neuroimaging data.  
Roskies is definitely right that “neuroimages are inferentially distant from brain activity” 
(2008, 30) and results are too often overinterpreted. But her further conclusion that the inferential 
distance in neuroimaging cannot be univocally characterized is questionable. Roskies’s inferential 
distance problem can be satisfactorily addressed when we apply a hierarchical framework of models of 
inquiry to neuroimaging. In this framework, we can break down a neuroimaging study into its 
component parts from experimental design to initial data collection, and from preprocessing of raw 
data to statistical modeling and analysis. We can then assess the error characteristics associated with 
each component. Let us say that an experiment yields significantly higher activation in a certain brain 
region in the experimental condition. Thus, researchers conclude that the cognitive task performed by 
subjects led to this result and they draw the substantive inference that the brain region with higher 
activation is involved in the performance of this cognitive task. Now, we can carry out error-statistical 
analyses of this experiment looking carefully into the error characteristics or error probabilities of its 
component parts. If these error probabilities are high, then we do not have strong evidence for the 
inference. This is because the significant result may have been obtained due to a bias introduced by a 
component part of the experiment. For example, the neuroimaging scanner may have been 
oversensitive and detected background noise as task-related activation, or, as Klein pointed out, the 
chosen significance threshold may have been too liberal. If the error probabilities associated with the 
components of an experiment are low enough to rule out or minimize errors, then we can safely 
conclude that researchers have support for their substantive inference. This is how we can go the 
inferential distance, as it were. 
 
3. An Error-Statistical Approach to Functional Neuroimaging 
Klein and Roskies rightly emphasize methodological issues in neuroimaging, but they both seem to 
assume that these cannot be satisfactorily resolved. This can be contested, because Mayo’s error-
statistical (ES) notions of severe tests and error probabilities can be employed to address the issues 
raised by Klein and Roskies and problems of inference in neuroimaging can be resolved. In order to 
tackle problems of inference, we need to know the conditions under which we can conclude we have 
evidence for a hypothesis. We can start with a weak requirement: for an experiment or test, the 
weakest requirement is that it should not be guaranteed to find evidence for some effect regardless of 
whether or not there is a real effect. This gives us what Mayo and Spanos (2011) call the weak severity 
principle: Data x does not provide good evidence for a hypothesis H if x results from a test procedure 
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with a very low probability or capacity of having uncovered the falsity of H (even if H is incorrect). 
This notion is the fundamental basis of the account that scrutinizes experiments by analyzing them 
with respect to their error probabilities – this is what Mayo calls the error-statistical (ES) account. 
Error probabilities provide the information on how frequently methods of research can discriminate 
between alternative hypotheses and how reliably they can detect errors. 
In light of these concepts, we can better address the question ‘when do data x provide good 
evidence for a hypothesis H?’ To do this, we can take Mayo’s full severity principle as a guide, which 
states: "Data x (produced by process G) provide a good indication or evidence for hypothesis H (just) 
to the extent that test T severely passes H with x" (Mayo 2005, 100). For a hypothesis H to pass a 
severe test T with x, two things must obtain; first, data x fits or agrees with H, and second, test T would 
have produced, with high probability, data that fit less well with H than x does, were H false (Mayo 
1996, 2005). Thus, data x is evidence for hypothesis H just to the extent that the accordance between x 
and H would be difficult to achieve were H false. One must have done a good job at probing the ways 
one may be wrong in inferring from an accordance between data x and hypothesis H to an inference to 
H (as well tested or corroborated). It is important to note that the severity of a test is not a feature of 
only the test itself. Severity assessments are carried out always on a specific test T, with specific test 
result x0 and a specific hypothesis H; so severity is a function of three things, the test (or the 
experiment); the data; and the specific hypothesis about which an inference is drawn (Mayo 2005). We 
can use the abbreviation SEV(T,x0,H) to mean “the severity with which H passes test T with x0” (Mayo 
and Spanos 2011), where the severity function SEV(T,x0,H) can be calculated to get a quantitative 
value between 0 and 1. The notion of severity can also be employed in discussing error characteristics 
of experimental tools. In any given experiment, to assess whether or not it constitutes a severe test of 
the hypothesis of interest, we need to know the error characteristics associated with its components, 
such as instruments and techniques used for collection and processing of data, and statistical modeling 
and analyses.  
In fMRI, often the hypothesis of interest, which I call the real effect hypothesis, predicts higher 
activation in some brain region in response to a cognitive stimulus or task. We can assess any given 
experiment with respect to whether or not it has put a specific real effect hypothesis to a severe test. If 
it has not, then we evaluate its results accordingly. If an experiment of low severity yields a result 
fitting the real effect hypothesis of interest, this does not constitute evidence for the hypothesis, 
because, with high probability, the experiment would have yielded a fitting result even if the 
hypothesis were false. The ES notions of severity and error probabilities help us properly assess the 
epistemic value of fMRI studies that may suffer from problems discussed by Klein, such as liberal 
significance thresholds or overly large samples. With high probability, an experiment with an overly 
large sample may yield results fitting the real effect hypothesis even when it is false. Such an 
experiment constitutes a low severity test of the hypothesis and we would not make the mistake of 
taking its results as evidence for it. The problem arising from increasing the number of subjects is 
called the large-N problem in philosophy of statistics, which can be resolved by complementing 
statistical tests with Mayo's notion of severe tests. As N gets larger, the variance of the data is reduced. 
Since the variance of the data is the denominator in the calculation of the test statistic, mathematically, 
the observed test statistic gets larger independently of the truth or falsity of the alternative hypothesis. 
Consequently, as N gets larger, it gets more probable to obtain a significant result in the absence of a 
real effect, that is, when the null hypothesis is true. Therefore, the ES account differentiates between 
experiments with different numbers of subjects; a significant result is less indicative of a real effect if it 
was obtained in an experiment with a large sample than in an experiment with a smaller sample (Mayo 
1996, 2005). To illustrate quantitatively, here is how values of severity would change with the same 
outcome, d(x0)=1.96, σ = 2, and for the same inference, μ>0.2, but on the basis of different sample 
sizes, n: for n=50: SEV(μ>0.2)=.895, for n=100:SEV(μ>0.2)=.831, and for n=1000: SEV(μ>0.2)=.115 
(Mayo and Spanos 2011). As can be seen, the severity of inferring μ > 0.2 with outcome d(x0) = 1.96 
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decreases as the sample size n gets larger. In fMRI, we can think of the outcome as significantly 
increased activation in a brain region as predicted by the real effect hypothesis. If such an outcome 
obtains in an experiment with an overly large sample, we do not take it as evidence, because the 
experiment would be a low severity test of the hypothesis. We may have obtained that outcome as a 
result of having a large sample size that makes for an oversensitive test picking up noise as if a real 
effect. In this way, we can resolve problems of inference resulting from overly large samples in fMRI 
studies. Other problems Klein raised can be similarly addressed when we employ ES notions. For 
example, we can show that the more liberal the significance threshold in an experiment the lower is the 
severity of that experiment as a test of the hypothesis of interest, because the overly liberal threshold 
would increase the probability of obtaining a significant result in the absence of a real effect. 
The ES account can also be employed to address Roskies’s inferential distance problem. As 
stated above, the severity of a test is a function of three things; the experiment; the data obtained in the 
experiment; and the specific hypothesis. In order to assess severity, one needs accurate 
characterizations of all these aspects of an experiment. To achieve this, we can look at an experimental 
inquiry in terms of a hierarchy of models that connect the primary hypothesis or question being 
investigated to the detailed procedures of data generation and analysis. For any experimental inquiry, 
three types of models are defined; models of primary hypotheses, models of experiment, and models of 
data (Mayo 1996). These models help clearly describe the local procedures that are required to 
establish the connection between raw data and the hypotheses of interest.  
The primary model includes the local hypotheses, which may have been derived from a higher-
order scientific theory or from previous studies, and they correspond to a given primary question or 
problem. In fMRI, the primary hypothesis often predicts the amount of activity in a given brain region. 
The experimental model provides the link between the data and the primary hypothesis being tested. 
Mayo talks about two functions of the experimental model, the first function is to provide “a kind of 
experimental analog of the salient features of the primary model” (1996, 133). If the primary problem 
is testing a hypothesis, then the experimental model tells us what is expected to obtain in this 
experiment if the hypothesis is true, possibly by using other auxiliary hypotheses. The second function 
of the experimental model is “to specify analytical techniques for linking experimental data to the 
questions of the experimental model” (ibid., 134). Because of many sources of error that influence the 
data collection process, the data will very rarely, perhaps never, agree exactly with the experimental 
prediction. In this case, the experimental model may statistically formulate the link between the 
primary hypothesis and the data model. The data models provide the answers to two types of 
questions; the before-trial question is about how raw data should be collected and modeled to be put in 
canonical form in order to be linked to the experimental model. The after-trial question is about how 
we can check whether or not the data collection procedures were in line with the assumptions of 
experimental models. 
The application of the hierarchical framework of models to fMRI can help delineate and 
appraise the experimental procedures that are involved. We can also find out to what extent, if at all, 
these procedures may introduce errors and influence the results independently of the truth or falsity of 
functional hypotheses, so that we can assess the reliability of the inferences drawn on the basis of those 
results. So, this framework provides a way of characterizing the steps in the inferential distance 
between raw data and final neuroimages. We can start by looking at the kinds of hypotheses that fMRI 
experiments are meant to test. Often, these are statements derived from theories of cognition or results 
of previous studies and take the form “brain region X is involved in the performance of cognitive task 
C.” From this functional hypothesis we can derive the prediction that “when subjects perform C, there 
is going to be a significant amount of activation in brain region X.” Along with the functional 
hypothesis, this prediction can be placed in the primary model. In fMRI, the connection between the 
primary hypothesis and its experimental analogs can be made by stating what would happen in the 
experiment if the primary hypothesis is true: “as subjects in the fMRI scanner perform an example of 
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the cognitive task C, the scanner will register a significantly high amount of activation in brain region 
X.”  
Designing the experiment, choosing the experimental task, and other related aspects would be 
placed in data models. The experimental design ensures that we get the kind of data to test the primary 
hypothesis; so it helps connect the actual experiment to experimental models and primary hypotheses 
of the inquiry. Once we have raw data, we have to put it in canonical statistical form in order to carry 
out statistical analyses, which is not easy because fMRI scanners yield extremely complex data sets. 
Decisions about preprocessing steps, such as the use of spatial and/or temporal filters, signal 
averaging, and any other necessary procedures would be placed in data models. Once preprocessing is 
complete, we have to obtain a statistically adequate model of the data generating mechanism and then 
carry out significance tests to make inferences about the primary hypothesis. All these procedures 
would also be placed in the data models. The application of this hierarchical framework provides a 
more complete understanding of how an fMRI experiment works and what it can and cannot give us. 
Once we identify and correctly place the component parts of an experiment in this framework, we can 
then assess the error probabilities, or error characteristics, associated with each component. Thus, we 
can find out how and to what extent they may introduce errors in the experiment. Naturally, fleshing 
out the details of how fMRI works and how these error probabilities can be assessed is beyond the 
scope of this paper. I have provided in-depth treatments of these topics elsewhere (Aktunc 2011, under 
review). Here, I focus on a further elaboration of what goes in the primary model of an fMRI 
experiment. 
 
4. Kinds of Hypotheses in fMRI 
As seen above, a statement of the form “Brain region X is involved in the performance of cognitive 
task C” is placed in the primary models as the hypothesis to be tested in an fMRI experiment. 
However, this statement is ambiguous; one has to consult some basic characteristics of fMRI to 
disambiguate it. The goal in fMRI is to relate changes in brain physiology over time to an experimental 
manipulation. This relation is established in terms of the hemodynamic response, also known as the 
blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) response. If a certain brain region is involved in the 
performance of a cognitive task, then, when an individual performs it, there is going to be increased 
activation in that region of the brain. Increased activation causes an increased need for energy and this 
leads to an increase in local glucose metabolism and oxygen consumption. Oxygen is carried to cells 
by oxygenated hemoglobin in the blood, so there results an imbalance between concentrations of 
oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin in activated regions. Since these two types of hemoglobin 
have different magnetic properties, the imbalance leads to inhomogeneities in the magnetic field. The 
fMRI scanner detects these inhomogeneities and thus provides data on hemodynamic activity in terms 
of the magnitude of the BOLD response (Huettel et al. 2008). 
Huettel et al. (2008) state that in a typical fMRI study three distinct kinds of hypotheses are 
involved: 1) Hemodynamic Hypothesis: a hypothesis about relationships between hemodynamic 
activity and performance of cognitive tasks. 2) Neuronal Hypothesis: a hypothesis about neuronal 
activity. Since fMRI does not directly measure neuronal activity, we cannot know for certain the 
amount of neuronal activity; researchers assume that if the observed hemodynamic activity is high then 
neuronal activity is also high. 3) Theoretical Hypothesis: essentially a hypothesis about cognitive 
function. Researchers use fMRI results to address questions about how cognitive processes work and 
how they are realized by which neural structures and processes. A crucial question is ‘which of these 
three kinds of hypotheses can we put to severe tests in an fMRI experiment?’ Since fMRI gives us data 
only on hemodynamic activity, it appears that hypotheses about hemodynamic activity can, at least 
potentially, be put to severe tests in fMRI experiments. These hemodynamic hypotheses can be 
formulated in terms of statistical hypotheses, which can then be tested against fMRI data. Researchers 
want to see what differences there are, if any, between amounts or patterns of activation in certain 
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regions of the brain across control and experimental conditions. Often, the hemodynamic hypothesis 
predicts higher activation in the experimental condition. We can use 0 to designate mean 
hemodynamic activation (in a certain brain region) in the control condition and we can use 1 to 
designate mean hemodynamic activation (in the same region) in the experimental condition when 
subjects do the chosen cognitive task. These two means, μ0 and μ1, as well as the difference between 
them, μ1 – μ0, are unknown parameters, and researchers are interested in making inferences about the 
difference μ1 – μ0. Statistical hypotheses about the difference between μ0 and μ1 can be stated as null 
and alternative hypotheses in a significance test. In statistical hypothesis tests, we can test the null 
hypothesis, H0: μ1 - μ0 = 0 versus the alternative hypothesis, H1: μ1 - μ0 > 0 that are formulated in the 
context of a statistical model of fMRI data. The alternative hypothesis so formulated is connected 
through a statistical model of data to the hemodynamic hypothesis, which predicts a significantly 
higher amount of activation in a certain brain region when subjects perform the chosen cognitive task. 
In an fMRI experiment, the real effect hypothesis referred to before is no other than the hemodynamic 
hypothesis. The critical point is that using error probabilities we can find out whether or not specific 
fMRI experiments constitute severe tests of specific hemodynamic hypotheses. Thus, fMRI data do 
have evidential import for hemodynamic hypotheses.  
The neuronal and theoretical hypotheses are not subjected to severe tests by fMRI. The 
neuronal hypothesis makes an assertion about neuronal activity and we cannot reliably infer much 
about that from fMRI data. For the observed hemodynamic activity could be due to factors other than 
neuronal activity, such as the activity of glial cells (Huettel et al. 2008). Logothetis (2008) reinforces 
the point that observed hemodynamic activation does not always mean that it was caused by neuronal 
activity.  Therefore, the neuronal hypothesis could be false and yet the fMRI experiment would not 
detect this. As for the theoretical hypothesis, fMRI obviously does not test for the existence of 
cognitive modules or functions as defined by theories of cognitive science. This is related to the 
criticisms of neuroimaging raised by Uttal (2001) and Hardcastle and Stewart (2002). They have 
argued that there is an inherent circularity in assuming the existence of localized and well-defined 
cognitive modules prior to doing an fMRI experiment and then taking the results of the experiment as 
support for modularist conclusions. When Uttal (2001) and Hardcastle and Stewart (2002) raise the 
circularity problem and when Klein (2010) calls into question the evidential value of fMRI data for 
functional hypotheses, they are talking about problems of using neuroimaging results as support for 
theoretical hypotheses. The ES approach shows that fMRI data cannot be taken as evidence for this 
type of theoretical hypotheses, but at the same time, it helps identify what we can reliably take as the 
fMRI finding, specifically whatever the hemodynamic hypothesis states in an experiment  provided 
that the related inference to H1: μ1 – μ0 > 0 passes severely with the data obtained in that experiment.  
This hemodynamic finding can then be used as an additional constraint on theories of cognitive 
science. The figure below summarizes the conclusion of the discussion above. The link between the 
hemodynamic hypothesis and H1: μ1 – μ0 > 0 shows that the hemodynamic hypothesis is embedded 
into a statistical model of the data and it is framed in terms of the parameters μ0 and μ1. 
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5. Hemodynamic Findings and Novel Construals of Cognition 
I have argued above that the hemodynamic hypothesis need not be underdetermined by fMRI data, or 
at least the corroboration that hemodynamic hypotheses gain from fMRI experiments are not shaken by 
the underdetermination neuronal or theoretical hypotheses may suffer. In response, one may be 
compelled to ask "what is hemodynamic knowledge good for?" In addition to providing novel 
constraints on existing theories, hemodynamic findings are helpful in the development of new models 
of cognition. I wish to illustrate this with a set of hemodynamic hypotheses well-known as the 
hemispheric encoding/retrieval asymmetry (HERA) model. 
The HERA model began as a straightforward description of empirical regularities found in 
positron emission tomography (PET) studies of memory—although it works differently from fMRI, 
PET, too, provides measurements of cerebral blood flow, so it can support hemodynamic hypotheses. 
Researchers had obtained differential activation patterns in left and right prefrontal cortical regions 
when subjects engaged in encoding and retrieval tasks of episodic memories. Here, I am interested in 
observed relationships between hemodynamic activity and performance of operationally well-defined 
cognitive tasks. In the context of HERA, the terms ‘semantic memory’ and ‘episodic memory’ can be 
used simply to refer to these different kinds of tasks without having to worry too much about the 
theoretical baggage these terms may carry. The HERA model was proposed in a data-driven manner; 
in a series of PET experiments, subjects performed three types of tasks; semantic memory retrieval, 
episodic memory encoding, and episodic memory retrieval. Tulving and his colleagues (1994) 
summarized regularities in observed patterns of brain activation: 1) Left prefrontal cortical regions are 
activated in semantic memory retrieval to a greater extent than right prefrontal cortical regions; 2) Left 
prefrontal cortical regions are activated in encoding novel features of retrieved information into 
episodic memory to a greater extent than the right prefrontal cortical regions; and, 3) Right prefrontal 
cortical regions are involved in episodic memory retrieval to a greater extent than left prefrontal 
cortical regions. 
 Following this initial proposal, and in light of new findings from fMRI experiments with better 
scanners and sharper experimental design, Habib, Nyberg, and Tulving (2003) reformulated HERA to 
be stricter and more precise in its assertions. In this reformulation there were two specific 
hemodynamic hypotheses which were expressed using abbreviations; ‘Enc’ meant encoding, ‘Ret’ 
meant retrieval, ‘L’ stood for a given left prefrontal cortical region and ‘R’ stood for the corresponding 
region in the right prefrontal cortex. Combinations of task (Enc or Ret) and regions (L or R) stood for 
the observed activation during a given task in a given region. Thus, the two hemodynamic hypotheses 
that constitute the HERA model were stated: 1. (Enc L–Ret L) > (Enc R–Ret R); 2. (Ret R–Enc R) > 
(Ret L–Enc L) (ibid.,p.241). Since the reformulation of HERA, several fMRI experiments yielded 
Primary models 
- hemodynamic 
hypothesis 
- neuronal hypothesis 
- theoretical 
hypothesis 
 
Experimental models 
- As subjects  in the 
fMRI scanner perform 
an example of the 
cognitive task C, the 
scanner, with high 
probability, will register 
a significantly high 
amount of activation in  
brain region X. 
Data models 
- Design of the fMRI 
experiment: choice of 
tasks, decisions of 
filtering, etc. 
- Preprocessing of raw 
data; signal averaging, 
spatial and temporal 
filtering, Fourier 
transforms, etc. 
- Statistical modeling 
and significance tests. 
 H1: μ1 – μ0 > 0 
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results that supported the HERA model (e.g. Babiloni et al. 2006; Okamoto et al. 2011).  
 The HERA model was proposed as a description of a set of findings showing an asymmetry 
between encoding and retrieval tasks in episodic memory. Regardless of what large-scale theory one 
adopts, the HERA model stands as a set of hemodynamic findings, which came out of a data-driven 
approach and did not assume too much about theories of memory systems. Take away terms like 
semantic memory or episodic memory and we can still talk about the HERA model in terms of 
specific, well-defined remembering tasks. The hemodynamic findings would still stand if theories of 
cognitive science change and new theories differently divide and categorize human memory or if they 
even exclude categorizations. HERA is a contribution to cognitive neuroscience and its development 
illustrates how experimental knowledge in neuroimaging grows. When we look at fMRI with an eye 
toward appreciating the kind of knowledge it can reliably provide, it appears that a more fruitful 
approach is seeing neuroimaging experiments as tools for expanding our knowledge of relationships 
between cognition and hemodynamic processes in the brain rather than seeing them as merely novel 
constraints on existing theories. 
Furthermore, the growth of hemodynamic knowledge can help researchers develop novel 
conceptualizations of cognition and its substrates in the brain. Let us recall from above that observed 
hemodynamic activity could be due to factors other than neuronal activity, such as the activity of glial 
cells. The traditional view of glia is that they passively support and maintain neurons; support 
neurotransmission, maintain ionic balance in extracellular space, and insulate axons to speed up action 
potentials. However, recent findings suggest that especially astrocytes, a type of glia, have more active 
roles in brain function. New research shows that glia are involved in synapse formation, modulation of 
synaptic function through bidirectional communication with neurons, and regulate blood flow. 
Astrocytes talk to each other through waves of calcium ions, terminate neurotransmitters, and mediate 
their recycling. Astrocytes also talk to neurons; they monitor and respond to neuronal activity and 
possess the same receptors as neurons. Neurotransmitters released by neurons activate Ca-based 
signalling in astrocytes, which release neuroactive substances and signal back to neurons, thus form a 
feedback loop and enhance or inhibit neuronal activity (see Bezzi and Volterra, 2001; Allen and Barres 
2009). 
Of course, there is still a lot to learn about glia and their functions, but these new findings force 
a rethinking of the fMRI BOLD response with respect to the kind of activity it may point to in the 
brain. The traditional view of glia may have created a “neuronal bias” in cognitive neuroscience, which 
has come to have a neuron-centric view of the brain and cognition. Perhaps it is time to revise our 
neuronally inspired view and integrate the recent discoveries about glial function in our theoretical 
construals of cognition. When fMRI is freed from the neuronal bias, it can help greatly in such 
revisions as a source of hemodynamic knowledge. Since fMRI does not tell us whether increased 
activation is due to either glial or neuronal activity, specific inferences to glial or neuronal activity may 
not be reliable. However, inferences from fMRI results to increased hemodynamic activity are reliable 
provided that the given experiments constitute severe tests of the hemodynamic hypotheses of interest. 
These hypotheses can be interpreted to refer to the combined workings of glia and neurons as subjects 
perform cognitive tasks. Thus, hemodynamic findings can be fruitful in the development of novel 
conceptualizations of how the human brain gives rise to cognition incorporating glial contributions to 
cognitive processing. These conceptualizations can usher in new connectionist or dynamic models of 
cognition inspired by not just neurons but also glia, which would help researchers gain novel and 
broader insights into cognition and its substrates in the brain.
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